Countries won’t sign this Moon exploration agreement because it’s too ‘US-centric’
Natural allies
All seven partners who have agreed to the accords with the US are natural collaborators on the Artemis Program and will easily adhere to the stated principles. Japan iskeen to engagein lunar exploration. Luxembourg has dedicated legislationallowing for space miningand has also signed an additional collaborative agreement with the US.
[Read:Why the moon’s early magnetic field might be responsible for life on earth]
The UAE and Australia are both actively trying to establish collaborative links with the broader space industry, so this represents aperfect opportunityfor them to build up capacity. Italy, the UK , and Canada all have ambitions todevelop theirspace manufacturing industries and will see this as a chance to grow their economies.
The contents of the accords are relatively uncontentious. Throughout, there is a reference to the existing Outer Space Treaty framework, so they are tied closely to existing norms of space law. As such, the accords appear deliberately designed to reassure countries that this is not an instruction on how to behave from a hegemonic power.
There is an explicit statement that the mining of space resources is in accordance with international law. This follows on from the controversial passing of theSpace Act 2015, which put the right to use and trade space resources into American domestic law. But section 10(4) of the accords also commits to ongoing discussions at the UNCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spaceas to how the legal framework should develop.
The rest of the accords focus on safety in space operations, transparency, and interoperability (which refers to the ability of space systems to work in conjunction with each other).
Controversial issues
If the substance is reassuring, the US promotion of the accords outside of the “normal” channels of international space law – such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space – will be a cause of consternation for some states. By requiring potential collaborators to sign bilateral agreements on behavior instead, some nations will see the US as trying to impose their own quasi-legal rules. This could see the US leveraging partnership agreements and lucrative financial contracts to reinforce its own dominant leadership position.
Russia hasalready statedthat the Artemis Program is too “US-centric” to sign it in its present form. China’s absence is explained by the US congressionalprohibition on collaborationwith the country. Concerns that this is a power grab by the US and its allies are fuelled by the lack of any African or South American countries amongst the founding partner states.
Intriguingly Germany, France, and India are also absent. These are countries with well-developed space programs that would surely have benefited from being involved in Project Artemis. Their opposition may be down to a preference for the Moon Agreement and a desire to see a properly negotiated treaty governing lunar exploration.
The European Space Agency(ESA) as an organization has not signed on to the accords either, but a number of ESA member states have. This is unsurprising. The ambitious US deadline for the project will clash with the lengthy consultation of the 17 member states required for the ESA to sign on as a whole.
Ultimately, Artemis Accords are revolutionary in the field of space exploration. Using bilateral agreements that dictate norms of behavior as a condition of involvement in a program is a significant change in space governance. With Russia and China opposing them, the accords are sure to meet diplomatic resistance and their very existence may provoke antagonism in traditional UN forums.
Questions also remain about the impact that the looming US election and the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the program. We already know that President Trumpis keento see astronauts on the Moon by 2024. The approach of his Democratic rival, Joe Biden, is a lot less clear. He may well be less wedded to the 2024 deadline and instead aim for broader diplomatic consensus on behavior through engagement at the UN.
While broader international acceptance may be desirable, the US believes that the lure of the opportunities afforded by the Artemis Program will bring other partners on board soon enough. Space-active states now face a stark choice: miss out on being the first to use the resources of the Moon, or accept the price of doing business and sign up to the Artemis Accords.
This article is republished fromThe ConversationbyChristopher Newman, Professor of Space Law and Policy,Northumbria University, Newcastleunder a Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article.
Story byThe Conversation
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